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Abstract
We develop the theory of partial satisfaction relations for structures that may
be proper classes and define a satisfaction predicate (|=∗) appropriate to such
structures. We indicate the utility of this theory as a framework for the devel-
opment of the metatheory of first-order predicate logic and set theory, and we
use it to prove that for any recursively enumerable extension Θ of ZF there is
a finitely axiomatizable extension Θ′ of GB that is a conservative extension of
Θ. We also prove a conservative extension result that justifies the use of |=∗ to
characterize ground models for forcing constructions.
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1 Introduction
In discussions of the theory of sets it is a common practice to use the termi-
nology of satisfaction and models informally with reference to structures that
are proper classes. An “inner model”, for example, is informally defined as a
proper transitive class M such that (M ;∈) “satisfies” ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory). In the context of a pure set theory, such as ZF, any such reference is
necessarily informal for two reasons:
1. Proper classes do not exist, and can only be referred to as predicates
applicable to sets.
2. ZF is not finitely axiomatizable, so one cannot say that M is an inner
model by means of a single sentence relativized to M .
For example, in the context of ZF the statement
(1.1) L is a model of ZFC
is understood to stand for the set of all sentences θL, where θ is an axiom of
ZFC, and θL is the sentence θ with all quantified variables are restricted to
constructible sets. In the context of a class theory such as the von Neumann-
Bernays-Go¨del, or Go¨del-Bernays, theory GB, one can demonstrate the existence
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of the class L of constructible sets, and one might expect to be able to formulate
(1.1) as a single sentence
(1.2) L |= ZFC,
but the interpretation of such a sentence is problematic, inasmuch as it is not
possible to prove—in a conservative1 class theory such as GB—that there exists
a satisfaction relation for L (or for proper class structures in general).
In this article, we examine issues related to the existence and use of partial
satisfaction relations for proper class structures in the context of conservative
class theories with and without the Infinity axiom. In particular, we propose a
definition of satisfaction for proper class structures that is weak enough that
(1.2), for example, is a theorem of GB, but strong enough that (1.2) implies θL
for every axiom θ of ZF. For the sake of emphasis, in this article we denote
this universal satisfaction predicate by ‘|=∗’, but there is no reason its definition
(2.10) could not be taken as the primary definition of ‘|=’. By means of |=∗,
the conventional informal use of proper class models may be rendered formally
correct with minimal modifications to standard practice. Such notions as ele-
mentary substructure and elementary embedding of proper class structures are
formalizable in GB in a similar way, as are the notions of forcing relation and
boolean valuation, all of which are subject to the same limitations as satisfaction
in conventional treatments.
Section 2 is devoted to a brief explication of the notion of satisfaction for
proper class structures and related ideas. These are quite straightforward, and
we do not suppose that they are entirely new; however, we have not found any
systematic treatment of them in the existing literature. In particular, we have
not found a definition of |=∗ or a discussion of its use in set theory. We therefore
state the principal theorems and sketch their (straightforward) proofs. We do
this primarily in the context of the theories S and C, which we define respectively
to be ZF and GB with the Infinity axiom omitted. Note that these theories do
not contain ¬ Infinity, so they may be extended to ZF and GB, respectively,
by the addition of Infinity. S + ¬ Infinity is—for all practical purposes—Peano
arithmetic. The use of satisfaction relations for proper classes in C permits an
essentially finitary, but nonetheless efficient, development of the theory of first-
order predicate logic.2 The book Foundations of Mathematics: A Generalist’s
Guide[10] employs these ideas throughout and demonstrates the clarity and
1By ‘conservative’ we mean that the class comprehension axiom schema employs only
formulas without bound class variables.
2We do not present this development here beyond what is necessary for the purposes of this
article; but the following example is worthy of mention. Consider Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem, which presents a sentence σ that says, in effect, that σ is not provable in S (which we
use here for convenience instead of the more customary Peano arithmetic), and states that σ
is not a theorem of S, even though it is (by virtue of that fact) true. This is ordinarily proved
in a metatheory other than S, which is often not explicitly characterized, but may generally
be considered to be ZF. Then it is stated that the theorem and proof could be given in S with
the additional hypothesis that S is consistent. Therefore, assuming Con S, S0Con S, which is
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. An actual proof of the first theorem in S is generally
considered such an ungainly thing that it is not usually given in any detail, despite the fact
that its existence is critical to the proof of the second theorem. This defect can be remedied
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precision they bring to the explication of the foundations of mathematics, from
elementary logic to advanced set theory.
In Section 3 we prove a generalization of the well known theorem that GB is
a finitely axiomatizable conservative extension of ZF. This is Theorem 3.1. The
universal satisfaction predicate is not involved in the statement of this result,
but (a slight variation of) it is intrinsic to the proof.
In Section 4 we discuss the implications of the use of |=∗ for the correlation
between the forcing relation within a transitive model M of ZF, and the satis-
faction relation in a generic extension M [G]. If M is a countable set, of course,
pP φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) iff for everyM -generic filter G on a partial order P ∈M , if
p ∈ G then M [G] |= φ[xG0 , . . . , x
G
n−1]. Essentially the same correlation holds in
the general case (when M is an uncountable set or a proper class), but it must
be stated without reference to generic filters.
This is the method of “arguing in a generic extension”, which conventionally
goes as follows. The theory Θ (Definition 4.1)—which includes ZF and also says
that the universe is V[G], where V is an inner model of ZF, and G is a V-generic
filter on P—holds in M [G] whenever G is an M -generic filter on P ∈M , and V
is interpreted asM . “Arguing in a generic extension” means proving something
in Θ to demonstrate that something is forced.
If we adopt |=∗, it is natural to use the theory Θ′ defined in (4.7), which
differs from Θ in that it includes GB and implements the assumption that V is an
inner model of ZF as the single sentence pV |=∗ ZFq, rather than all sentences
pθVq, where θ is an axiom of ZF. To justify the inference that something is
forced from the existence of a proof in Θ′, we show that Θ′ is a conservative
extension of Θ. This is Theorem 4.9.
In Section 5, for the sake of completeness, we define a universal forcing
relation and universal boolean valuation function that are analogous to the
universal satisfaction relation, by means of which the conventional informal use
of forcing relations and boolean valuations for proper classes may be rendered
formally correct—again, with minimal modifications to standard practice.
2 The role of satisfaction for proper classes in
set theory and its metatheory
2.1 Some useful conventions
Recall the definition of S and C as ZF and GB with Infinity omitted. We regard
C (like GB) as a theory with two sorts of individuals: sets and classes. All
sets are classes. A class is proper
def
⇐⇒ it is not a set. Let c be the signature
(similarity type) of this theory, and let s be this signature with the class sort
omitted. Thus, s is the signature of S (and ZF). Let Ls and Lc be the languages
by proving the first theorem in C, rather than ZF, which is not any harder, and is arguably
more natural. Then we can invoke the well known result that C is a conservative extension of
S (2.2) to conclude rigorously that a proof of the first theorem in S exists, without giving it
in detail.
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appropriate to the above signatures. Given a theory Θ, i.e., a class of sentences,
let Θ
def
= its deductive closure.
It is well known that
(2.1) C is finitely axiomatizable,
whereas S is not.3
(2.2) C is a conservative extension of S in the sense that C ∩ Ls = S.
(2.2) has a simple infinitary proof (e.g., a ZF-proof), and a considerably more
involved finitary proof, (e.g., an S-proof). Given (2.2), it is appropriate to regard
C as a finitary theory, like S.
The discussion that follows, particularly the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 4.9,
involves a sufficiently intricate interplay of meta- and object theories that it
is helpful to use notation for linguistic expressions that distinguishes use and
mention more particularly than is often done; although the reader is forewarned
that we do not always maintain the highest standard in this regard—a judicious
ambiguity sometimes best serves the cause of clarity. Unless otherwise noted,
the following discussion takes place in the context of C. Thus, infinite sets may
not exist.
Given a text string that represents an expression ǫ in an object language,
if we flank it with corner quotes, p. . . q, we create a string that represents a
metalanguage name ν for ǫ. We use boldface versions of standard typographic
symbols for syntactical operations to denote various expression-building opera-
tions in any language. Thus, for example, φ∧ψ is the conjunction of formulas
φ and ψ in any language. We may extend this to some common predicate and
operation symbols, such as those for membership and identity. Thus, if u = pxq,
v = pyq, and w = pzq, then u∈ v∧ v∈w→ u∈w is pif x ∈ y and y ∈ z then
x ∈ zq.
Substitution of terms for variables in expressions is indicated with round
brackets. Suppose ǫ is an expression, and v0, . . . , vn−1 are in Free ǫ, the set of
free variables of ǫ. Suppose τ0, . . . , τn−1 are terms. ǫ
(
v0 · · · vn−1
τ0 · · · τn−1
)
is the expres-
sion that results from the indicated substitutions. When it is not necessary to
indicate the variables, ‘ǫ(τ0, . . . , τn−1)’ may be used. It is often convenient to use
3This is better known for GB and ZF. The finite axiomatization of GB as originally given
by Bernays[1] yields C if Infinity is omitted. A proof that ZF is not finitely axiomatizable may
be given in S+ ConZF as an easy application of the reflection theorem schema of ZF, i.e. of
the theorem of S that every instance of the reflection schema is a theorem of ZF. From this
it follows that S is not finitely axiomatizable (otherwise by adding Infinity we would have a
finite axiomatization of ZF); however, this gives the result as a theorem of S + ConZF . In
what may be viewed as a clever adaptation of the reflection method, Ryll-Nardzewski gave a
proof in ZF that S is not finitely axiomatizable[6]. Ryll-Nardzewski’s argument is intrinsically
infinitary, as it uses the satisfaction relation for (Vω ;∈). (In fact, the statement of his theorem
is intrinsically infinitary, as it applies to arbitrary true extensions of S, i.e., theories Θ ⊇ S
such that |=S Θ, where S is the full satisfaction relation for (Vω ;∈).) By way of illustrating
some of the ideas presented in this article, we show in the proof of Theorem 2.25 how Ryll-
Nardzewski’s argument may be (easily) adapted to provide a proof in S+Con S that S is not
finitely axiomatizable.
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a similar notation where ǫ is indicated using the corner-quote convention. For
example, suppose φ, ψ, and θ are respectively px ∈ yq, py ∈ zq, and px ∈ zq.
Then
pif (φ) and (ψ) then (θ)q (2.3)
is
pif x ∈ y and y ∈ z then x ∈ zq,
the result of substituting the metalanguage terms
px ∈ yq, py ∈ zq, px ∈ zq
in the metalanguage term
pif and then q,
where the underscores indicate variables (ranging over formulas) that we do not
need to name, as they are always substituted in the indicated fashion. When we
indicate such a substitution “in line”, as in (2.3), we give the brackets a lighter
tone than the surrounding text, so as to render them relatively unobtrusive and
to distinguish them from round brackets used as grouping indicators.
A similar convention applies to the use of square brackets to indicate assign-
ments of individuals in a structure to variables in an expression for the purpose
of valuation (or satisfaction in the case of formulas). Our first use of this is in
(3.6). Note that (3.6.1) is a conventional use of square brackets to create the
statement that the c-formula D is satisfied at the indicated values, viz., θ and y,
for its free variables. (3.6.2) is the statement that the formula indicated by the
corner-quoted text, with implicit variables in place of the insertions, is satisfied
when those variables are assigned the indicated values, viz., S and n.
For convenience we suppose that s and c have two binary predicate symbols,
one to denote membership and one to denote identity. The extended signatures
s′ and c′ have, in addition, a nulary operation symbol (i.e., a constant) to denote
the empty set 0, and a binary operation symbol to denote the add operation:
xxy = x ∪ {y}.
‘HF’ is a defined predicate in S characterizing the hereditarily finite sets.
In C, ‘HF’ may be used this way, and also as a constant denoting the class of
hereditarily finite sets. Note that in this setting, HF = Vω. For each x such that
HFx, let xˆ be a specific s′-term (a composition of p0q and pxq) whose value is
x, chosen by some fixed recursive procedure. Call xˆ the canonical name of x.
We will use an informal representation of structures, such that
(D0, D1, . . . ;X0, X1, . . . )
is a structure with domains (sorts) D0, D1, . . . ; and predicates and operations
X0, X1, . . . . We regard (D0, D1, . . . ;X0, X1, . . . ) as encoding D0, . . . , X0, . . . in
a way that is applicable to proper classes, as well as sets.
We suppose that for any signature ρ, the expression-building operations for
the corresponding language Lρ are uniformly defined in terms of 0 and x in
such a way that the rank of any expression is greater than the rank of any of
its subexpressions. If ρ ∈ HF then Lρ ⊆ HF.
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2.2 Partial satisfaction relations
Suppose ǫ is an expression. Then Free ǫ
def
= the set of free variables of ǫ. A is an
S-assignment for ǫ
def
⇐⇒ A is a finite function into |S| such that Free ǫ ⊆ DomA.
The value of an expression ǫ at an S-assignment A for ǫ is an element of |S| if ǫ
is a term and is a member of 2, i.e., {0, 1}, if ǫ is a formula, with 1 corresponding
to ‘true’ and 0 to ‘false’.
Suppose Φ is a class of ρ-expressions, Φ
def
= the class of subexpressions of Φ.
We regard an expression as a subexpression of itself, so Φ ⊇ Φ. Suppose S is a
ρ-structure. A Φ-valuation function for S is a function F such that
1. DomF consists of all 〈ǫ, A〉 such that ǫ ∈ Φ and A is an S-assignment for
ǫ;
2. F 〈ǫ, A〉 is in |S| if ǫ is a term and in 2 if ǫ is a formula;
3. F satisfies the usual recursive definition of valuation.
F is a partial valuation function for S
def
⇐⇒ F is a Φ-valuation for some class
Φ of ρ-expressions.
Suppose S is a ρ-structure. It is straightforward to show in C that partial
valuations for S agree on their common domain.
The following theorem is essentially trivial, but we take the time to state it
and sketch the proof to point out where the corresponding proof for the class Fρ
of all ρ-formulas fails when S is a proper class. Here, as elsewhere, we indicate
the theory within which a theorem is stated and proved; in this case it is C. We
do the same for definitions.
Theorem 2.4. [C] Suppose S is a ρ-structure. Then there is a unique T ρ-
valuation function for S, where T ρ is the class of ρ-terms.
Proof. Suppose τ is a term and A is an assignment for τ . F is a 〈τ, A〉-valuation
function forS
def
⇐⇒ F satisfies the usual definition of valuation function for pairs
〈τ ′, A〉, where τ ′ is a subexpression of τ . Note that Free τ ′ ⊆ Free τ , so A is
an assignment for τ ′. A 〈τ, A〉-valuation function is finite and is therefore a
set. We now show that for any term τ and assignment A for τ , there is a
unique 〈τ, A〉-valuation function, by supposing toward a contradiction that the
class C of terms τ ′ with Free τ ′ ⊆ DomA for which there is no 〈τ ′, A〉-valuation
function, is nonempty. The definition of C employs only set-quantification, so C
exists. Let τ0 ∈ C be of minimal complexity. One easily derives a contradiction.
Now we can define the value of τ at A as the value assigned to τ by the
unique 〈τ, A〉-valuation function. Again, the quantification over 〈τ, A〉-valuation
functions is set-quantification, so the valuation function exists.
The same argument works for quantifier-free formulas φ, because in this
case, an assignment for φ is also an assignment for any subexpression of φ;
but this is not the case if φ contains quantification. For example, if φ = ∃v ψ,
the definition of the value of φ at A involves the values of ψ at assignments
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A ∪ {(v, a)} for ψ, where a ranges over |S|. Thus, in defining the value of φ at
A, it is not enough to quantify over 〈φ,A〉-valuation functions as in the proof
of Theorem 2.4; instead, we must quantify over {ψ}-valuation functions for ψ
a subformula of φ. These are proper classes if S is a proper class, so we have
no justification in C for concluding that a class exists such as C in the proof of
Theorem 2.4.
It is conventional to speak of valuation of formulas in terms of satisfaction.
Given a valuation function F , the corresponding satisfaction relation S is given
by
〈φ,A〉 ∈ S↔F 〈φ,A〉 = 1.
We adapt the usual symbol for satisfaction to the representation of partial sat-
isfaction by letting |=S φ[A]
def
= 〈φ,A〉 ∈ S when S is a {φ}-satisfaction relation
for a structure S, and A is an S-assignment for φ. The preceding discussion
shows that we may not be able to prove in C the existence of a full satisfaction
relation for a proper class structure. Indeed, it shows that we may not be able
to prove the ostensibly weaker statement that for every formula φ there is a
{φ}-satisfaction relation.
We do, however, have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5. [C] Suppose S is a ρ-structure, ψ and ψ′ are ρ-formulas, and
{ψ}- and {ψ′}-satisfaction relations exist for S. Suppose φ is obtained from ψ
and/or ψ′ by a single formula-building operation: ¬,∨,∧,→,↔,∃v,∀v. Then a
{φ}-satisfaction relation exists.
Proof. Straightforward.
Definition 2.6. [C] Suppose ρ ⊆ HF and n ∈ ω. Let Φρn
def
= the set of ρ-formulas
of rank < n, i.e., Fρ ∩ Vn.
Note that since the expression-building operations are rank-increasing, Φρn =
Φρn. If ρ is HF, we may use the canonical naming convention to formulate the
following theorem, which may be called a metatheorem, inasmuch as it states
that an infinite collection of sentences are theorems of C. The theorem itself is
formulated and proved in S.
Theorem 2.7. [S] Suppose ρ is a signature and ρ is HF. Suppose n is a finite
ordinal. Let ρˆ and nˆ be the canonical names for ρ and n. Then C⊢ pfor every
(ρˆ)-structure S there exists a Φ
(ρˆ)
(nˆ)-satisfaction relation for S
q.
Proof. Let ρ be fixed. We proceed induction on the complexity of formulas
using the fact that C proves Theorem 2.5.
Definition 2.8. [C] Suppose S is a ρ-structure.
1. S is weakly satisfactory
def
⇐⇒ for every ρ-formula φ there exists a {φ}-
satisfaction relation for S, equivalently, for every finite Φ there is a Φ-
satisfaction relation.
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2. S is satisfactory
def
⇐⇒ there exists a full satisfaction relation, i.e., an Fρ-
satisfaction relation, for S, where Fρ is the class of all ρ-formulas.
Theorem 2.9. [C] Suppose S is a structure. If S is a set then S is satisfactory,
i.e., the full satisfaction relation for S exists.
Proof. Straightforward.
2.3 The universal satisfaction predicate
As noted above, the existence of satisfaction relations for proper class structures
is problematic, and the following definition is useful in this context.
Definition 2.10. [C] Suppose S is a ρ-structure.
1. Suppose φ is a ρ-formula, andA is anS-assignment for φ. ThenS |=∗ φ[A]
def
⇐⇒ for every {φ}-satisfaction relation S for S, |=S φ[A].
2. Suppose Θ is a ρ-theory (a class of ρ-sentences). S |=∗ Θ
def
⇐⇒ for every
θ ∈ Θ, S |=∗ θ.
We call |=∗ the universal satisfaction predicate. Note the use of universal, rather
than existential, quantification over partial satisfaction relations in the definition
of |=∗.
The following theorems are relevant. The first is the completeness theorem
formulated in the essentially finitary theory C.
Theorem 2.11. [C] Suppose Θ is a consistent theory in a countable signature.
Then there is a satisfactory structure S such that S |= Θ.
Proof. The Henkin construction of a model for a consistent theory Θ proceeds
by defining a complete consistent extension Θ′ of Θ with witnesses, which are
constants in an expanded signature s+. S is defined as the structure whose
individuals are the s+-terms and whose predicates and operations are given by
Θ′. Θ′ also gives the full satisfaction relation for S.
Theorem 2.12. [C] Suppose S is a weakly satisfactory ρ-structure, Θ is a
ρ-theory, σ is a ρ-sentence, S |=∗ Θ, and Θ⊢σ. Then S |=∗ σ.
Proof. Suppose π is a proof of σ from Θ. Let Φ be the set of formulas occurring
in π, and let S be a Φ-satisfaction relation for S. Each premise θ of π is then a
member of Θ, so |=S θ. It is straightforward to show that |=S σ, so S |=∗ σ.
Corollary 2.13. [C] Suppose S is a weakly satisfactory ρ-structure, Θ is a
ρ-theory, and S |=∗ Θ. Then Θ is consistent.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that Θ⊢σ∧¬ σ for some ρ-sentence σ.
Then S |=∗ σ∧¬ σ. Let S be a {σ∧¬ σ}-satisfaction relation for S. Then
|=S σ and |=S ¬ σ, but the latter implies that 6|=S σ, a contradiction.
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In this connection we note the following theorem.
Theorem 2.14. [C] Suppose S is a ρ-structure and σ is a ρ-validity, i.e., ⊢σ.
Then S |=∗ σ.
The proof is not quite as trivial as the theorem appears to be. To prove it
in C, as opposed to GB, we use the existence of a deductive system for logic
without identity that has the subformula property. For example, let LK be
the logischer klassischer Kalku¨l of Gentzen, as described in [9, Ch. 1, §2], and
let LK− be the same system with the cut rule omitted. The latter has the
subformula property, i.e., all formulas appearing in a proof of a sequent are
(instances of) subformulas of formulas appearing in the final sequent. By the
cut-elimination theorem (Gentzen’s Hauptsatz ), any sequent derivable in LK is
derivable in LK−.
To place this result in the proper perspective from the standpoint of C,
we digress briefly. Consider a fixed language in a signature without identity.
The completeness theorem for the sequent calculus is may be taken to be the
following assertion:
(2.15) If a sequent J = (Γ⇒∆) is not derivable then there is a an interpre-
tation that does not satisfy J , i.e., a structure S and an S-assignment A for
J such that S 6|= J [A], i.e., S |=
∧
Γ[A] and S 6|=
∨
∆[A].
Here an interpretation is ordinarily understood to be a structure S and an
S-assignment of all variables.
Working in C, however, we must be more specific as to the meaning of
‘interpretation’. Specifically, we define subvaluation as in [10, §2.5]. (Briefly,
this weakens the notion of partial valuation so that—for example—we may
assign the value true to φ∨ ψ without having assigned a value to both φ and
ψ; it is enough to have assigned the value true to one of these, leaving the
other unassigned; whereas in order to assign the value false to φ∨ ψ we must
have assigned false to both φ and ψ.) We define a J-interpretation to be a
structure S, an S-assignment of the free variables of J , and an S-subvaluation
that assigns a value to each formula in J at the given assignment. The standard
proof of (2.15) (e.g., the proof of Lemma 8.3 in [9]) yields the following:
(2.16) If J is not LK−-derivable then there is a J-interpretation that does
not satisfy J .
A straightforward modification of this method yields the following:
(2.17) If J is not LK-derivable then there is a full interpretation that does
not satisfy J .
This is equivalent to the completeness theorem (2.11) stated above.
The corresponding soundness theorems for LK− and LK are respectively:
(2.18) If J is LK−-derivable then every J-interpretation satisfies J .
(2.19) If J is LK-derivable then every full interpretation satisfies J .
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Given Infinity, the distinction between J- and full interpretations is irrelevant,
as we may restrict our attention to structures that are sets, so that any J-
interpretation is uniquely extendible to a full interpretation. This yields the
standard model-theoretic proof of the cut-elimination theorem: if J is LK-
derivable then every full interpretation satisfies J , so every J-interpretation
satisfies J , so J is LK−-derivable. In C, of course, this proof of cut-elimination
is not available, but there are effective proofs (e.g., the proof of Theorem 5.1 in
[9]) that may be rendered in C, and this yields the following as a theorem of C:
(2.20) A sequent J is LK−-derivable iff J is LK-derivable iff every full
interpretation satisfies J iff every J-interpretation satisfies J .
The following finitary proof of Theorem 2.14, depending as it does on (2.20), is
therefore another example of the value of the effective proof of cut-elimination.
Proof of Theorem 2.14. Suppose ρ is a signature without identity, σ is a ρ-
sentence, σ (i.e., the sequent 0⇒{σ}) is LK-derivable, and S is a {σ}-satisfaction
relation for S. By (2.20), |=S σ. If ρ is a signature with identity, a short addi-
tional argument is necessary.
We will be particularly concerned with satisfaction relations for (V ;∈), where
V is the class of all sets. Any mention of V as a structure in this article refers to
(V ;∈) or to an essentially equivalent structure with additional defined predicates
or operations.
Theorem 2.21. [S] Suppose n is a finite ordinal, and θ ∈ Vn is an s-sentence.
Then C⊢ pThe Φs(nˆ)-satisfaction relation for V exists. Let S be this relation.
Then (θ)↔ |=S p(θ)q↔ |=S (θˆ).q.
Proof. By induction on n, using Theorem 2.7.
Theorem 2.22. [C] (V ;∈) |=∗ S.
Proof. For any individual axiom θ ∈ S, we can prove p(V ;∈) |=∗ p(θ)qq directly.
In fact, since C⊢ θ, (2.21) informs us that C⊢ p(V ;∈) |=∗ p(θ)qq. Note that
the direct proof of p(V ;∈) |=∗ p(θ)qq uses θ as a premise. Thus, for example,
to prove that (V ;∈) |=∗ Pair we use the fact that pairs exist in V , arguing as
follows:
Suppose S is a {θ}-satisfaction relation for V , where
θ = ∀u, u′ ∃v ∀w (w∈ v↔w = u∨w = u′).
To show that |=S θ we must show that
∀x, x′ ∈ V ∃y ∈ V ∀z ∈ V (|=S p[z] ∈ [y]q↔ |=S p[z] = [x]q∨ |=S p[z] = [x′]q).
To this end, suppose x, x′ ∈ V . Let y = {x, x′}. Then y is as desired.
If Θ ⊆ S is an axiom schema, we cannot rely in this way on the fact that
C⊢Θ to show that (V ;∈) |=∗ Θ, as our proof must be finite. As it happens, in
these cases, it suffices to invoke a single corresponding axiom of C.
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Suppose, for example, that
θ = p∀y ∀x∃x′ ∀z (z ∈ x′↔ z ∈ x∧ (ψ)(z, y))q
is an instance of the Comprehension schema of S, where ψ is an s-formula with
two free variables. We must show that for every {θ}-satisfaction relation S for
V , |=S θ. Suppose, therefore, that S is a {θ}-satisfaction relation for V . We
must show that
∀y ∀x∃x′ ∀z |=S pz ∈ x′↔ z ∈ x∧ (ψ)(z, y)q.
Given y and x, let x′ = {z ∈ x ||=S ψ[z, y]}. Note that the existence of x′ as
a class follows from a single instance of the Comprehension schema of C (with
parameters x, S, ψ, z, y). That x′ is a set follows from the Separation axiom that
states that the intersection of a class with a set is a set.
The Collection schema is handled similarly.
Note that Theorem 2.14 does not permit us to drop the condition of weak
satisfactoriness in Theorem 2.12. In particular, despite Theorem 2.22, we have
the following.
Theorem 2.23. [S] If S is consistent then C0 pfor every theorem σ of S,
(V ;∈) |=∗ σq.
Proof. We will prove the contrapositive. Suppose C⊢ pfor every theorem σ of
S, (V ;∈) |=∗ σq. Then the following is a proof of ConS in C.
pSuppose toward a contradiction that S is inconsistent. Then S⊢∃u u 6=66
u. By hypothesis, therefore, (V ;∈) |=∗ ∃u u 6=6 6 u. Let S be a (∃u u 6=66 u)-
satisfaction relation for (V ;∈). Then |=S ∃u u 6=66 u, which is clearly not the
case. Hence, S is consistent.q
Thus, C⊢ pS is consistentq. Since C is a conservative extension of S, S⊢
pS is consistentq. By Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, S is therefore
inconsistent.
Corollary 2.24. [S] If S is consistent then C0 p(V ;∈) is weakly satisfactoryq.
Proof. Immediate from (2.23) with (2.12).
Theorem 2.25. [S] If S is consistent then S is not finitely axiomatizable.
Our proof is closely modeled on that of Ryll-Nardzewski[6], but we work
in C, rather than in ZF. Since C is a conservative extension of S, there is a
proof in S. Since we cannot prove ConS (assuming S is consistent) we must
specifically assume it. Note that this implies that the theory F = S+¬ Infinity is
consistent. (Every satisfactory model of S has a substructure, viz., its Vω , that
is a satisfactory model of F.) We will show that F is not finitely axiomatizable,
from which the theorem follows.
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Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that θ is a theorem of F such that {θ} ⊢F.
Given an existential s′-formula ψ = ∃v φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1), let Rψ(n, n
′) be the
formula
Ordn∧Ordn′∧∀v0, . . . , vm−1 ∈ Vn
(
∃v φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1)
→∃v ∈ Vn′ φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1)
)
,
and given a universal s′-formula ψ = ∀v φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1), let Rψ(n, n
′) be the
formula
Ordn∧Ordn′∧∀v0, . . . , vm−1 ∈ Vn
(
∀v ∈ Vn′ φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1
→∀v φ(v, v0, . . . , vm−1)
)
.
Clearly, for each such formula ψ,
F⊢∀Ordn∃Ordn
′ > n Rψ(n, n
′).
Let R be the conjunction of the formulas Rψ for all existential and universal
subformulas of θ. Then
F⊢∀Ordn∃Ordn
′ > n R(n, n′).
Let R′(n, k, f) be the s′-formula pn and k are ordinals, k > 1, and f is a function
with domain k such that f(0) = n and for all 0 < l < k, f(l) is the least ordinal
k > f(l − 1) such that R(f(l − 1), k)q. Let R′′(n, k) = ∃!f R′(n, k, f). As we
have just seen,
F⊢∀Ordn R
′′(n, 2).
It is also clear that
F⊢∀Ordn∀Ordk > 1 (R
′′(n, k)→R′′(n, k + 1)).
Hence, by the appropriate instance of the induction schema (Foundation) of S,
F⊢∀Ordn∀Ordk > 1 R
′′(n, k).
Now let s′′ be the expansion of the signature s′ by the addition of a single
constant symbol N , and let Θ be the s′′-theory F ∪ {pOrdNq} ∪ {pN > (nˆ)q |
n ∈ ω}. Recall that for any x ∈ HF, xˆ is a canonical s′-term denoting x. Since F
is consistent, so is Θ. By the completeness theorem 2.11, there is a satisfactory
structure S such that S |= Θ.
The ordinals of S are linearly ordered, with an initial segment isomorphic to
(ω;<). We suppose for simplicity that this segment (with its order) is actually
(ω;<).
Let N¯ = NS and let f¯ be the unique element of |S| such that S |=
R′[N¯ , N¯ , f¯ ]. Let f be the corresponding function from the ordinals in S pre-
ceding N¯ into OrdS.
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Let S′ be the substructure of S such that |S′| =
⋃
n∈ω V
S
f(n). By con-
struction, S′ is an initial segment of S containing N¯ and is a {θ}-elementary
substructure of S. Hence, S′ |= θ, so S′ |= F, and
S
′ |= ∃f ′ R′(N,N, f ′).
Let f¯ ′ be the unique element of |S′| such that
S
′ |= R′[N¯, N¯ , f¯ ′],
and let f ′ be the corresponding function from the ordinals inS′ preceding N¯ into
OrdS
′
. Note that Dom f ′ = Dom f . Since S′ is a {θ}-elementary substructure
of S, f ′ = f . This contradicts the fact that f ↾ ω is cofinal in OrdS
′
.
2.4 Inner models, elementary embeddings, etc.
The theory of partial satisfaction outlined above provides simple and useful
definitions of some of the more problematic notions in the metatheory of set
theory. For example, an inner model may be defined as a transitive proper class
M such that (M ;∈) |=∗ ZF.4 An elementary substructure of a ρ-structure S
(which may be a proper class) may be defined as a substructure S′ of S with
the property that for every ρ-formula φ and every {φ}-satisfaction relation S
for S, the restriction of S to S′ is a {φ}-satisfaction relation for S′. A function
j : S → T is elementary iff it is an isomorphism of S with an elementary
substructure of T.
Given the simplicity and utility of these ideas, it is somewhat surprising that
they have not gained greater currency in the exposition of the metatheoretical
aspects of set theory, especially given that fact that it is standard practice to
employ proper classes for this purpose—albeit informally as the extensions of
formulas (in which quantification is necessarily restricted to sets, since only
sets are actually supposed to exist). Since the definition of |=∗, etc., involves
quantification over classes, the explanation may reside in an instinctive aversion
to such quantification, deriving from a knowledge of the paradoxes that lurk
beyond the pale.
Adherence to the convention that class variables are not to be quantified is
illustrated in [8], which provides a formal definition of inner model by means of
a particular conjunction σ of axioms of ZFC and a formula Inn(M) such that
1. Inn(M) is p(σM ) and (M) is a transitive proper classq, and
2. for every theorem θ of ZFC, ZFC⊢ Inn(M)→ θM .
Another approach is to define an inner model as a transitive class that is al-
most universal and closed under Go¨del operations[3, p.182]. With any of these
approaches other ad hoc arrangements are necessary to deal with elementary
embeddings of inner models and related notions.
4Note that according to this definition, it is a theorem of GB that V is an inner model of
ZF and L is an inner model of ZFC.
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In [5, Appendix X] Levy makes the exclusion of class quantification explicit
in his description of the logical system P ∗, which extends the language Ls of
pure set theory by the addition of class variables, which cannot be quantified;
class terms {x | Φ(x)}, where x is a set variable and Φ is any formula; and
axioms that define the relations of membership and equality between sets and
class terms. The stipulation that class variables are not to be quantified allows
for a relatively easy syntactical proof (compared to [7]) that P ∗ is a conservative
extension of the theory P , which is essentially the axiom of extensionality in Ls.
3 Conservative extension of set theories to finitely
axiomatizable class theories
Theorem 3.1. [C] For any recursively enumerable extension Θ of S, there is a
finite extension Θ′ of C such that Θ′ ∩ Ls = Θ.
Note that this is the strongest possible theorem along these lines, inasmuch
as the deductive closure of a finite theory is necessarily recursively enumerable.
Note also that it is proved in C, which does not have Infinity. Since C is a
conservative extension of S, if we stated the straightforward translation of the
theorem into Ls it would be a theorem of S.
This should not be confused with the superficially similar results of Kleene[4]
and Craig and Vaught[2], which produce a finitely axiomatizable conservative
extension of a recursively enumerable ρ-theory Θ (which is required to have only
infinite models) by introducing additional predicates with axioms asserting that
they represent the ρ-language and satisfaction predicate, and that all sentences
of Θ are true.
To highlight the issues surrounding the existence of satisfaction relations and
the implications for provability, we first give a proof of the theorem in ZF, i.e.,
using Infinity, and we then show how to accomplish it in C.
Infinitary proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose Θ is a recursively enumerable exten-
sion of S. Let D be an s-formula with two free variables, all of whose quantifiers
are bounded, such that for all x ∈ HF, x ∈ Θ↔∃y ∈ HF D(x, y).
Let Θ′ = C ∪ {θ′}, where θ′ =
(3.2) p∀S ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∈ Vn (if ∃y ∈ Vn (D)(x, y) and S is the Φ
s
n-satisfaction
relation for V , then |=S x)q.
θ′ says roughly that for every sentence x ∈ Θ, V |=∗ x, making use of a slight
modification of the universal satisfaction predicate as given by Definition 2.10.
Since Theorem 3.1 does not mention satisfaction, we are free to define it as we
wish within the proof.
Claim 3.3. Θ′ ∩ Ls ⊇ Θ.
Proof. Suppose θ ∈ Θ. Let n ∈ ω be such that θ ∈ Vn and there exists
y ∈ Vn such that D(θ, y). It is easy to show that C⊢ p(θˆ) ∈ V(nˆ) ∧ (yˆ) ∈
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V(nˆ) ∧ (D(θˆ, yˆ))q. Thus, Θ
′ ⊢ pfor all S, if S is the Φs(nˆ)-satisfaction relation for
V then |=S (θˆ)q. It follows from Theorem 2.21 that Θ′ ⊢ θ. (3.3)
Claim 3.4. Θ′ ∩ Ls ⊆ Θ.
Proof. Suppose σ ∈ Θ′ ∩ Ls. We will use the completeness theorem to
show that Θ⊢σ by showing that σ holds in any satisfactory countable model of
Θ. Suppose, therefore, that M = (M ;E) is a satisfactory countable model of
Θ. Like all models of S, M has an initial segment that is isomorphic to (HF;∈),
and in the interest of efficiency we arrange that this initial segment actually is
(HF;∈). Since we are working in ZF, there are plenty of sets outside HF.
We now extend M to a model M′ = (M,M ′;E′) of C by adding, for each
subset A ofM definable overM (from a parameter inM) that is not already the
E-extension of a member ofM , a new element whose extension is A. (These are
the proper classes.) We will identify each X ∈M ′ \M with {x ∈M | xE′X}.
This is the standard construction for the infinitary proof that C is a conser-
vative extension of S. Since we are working in ZF, M′ is a set, and therefore
is satisfactory, so all references to satisfaction in M′ may be understood in the
usual way. It is easy to show that M′ |= C.
Claim 3.5. M′ |= θ′.
Proof. Remember that we have arranged that HF is an initial segment
of M and therefore of HFM
′
. Suppose toward a contradiction that n ∈ ωM,
θ, y ∈ (Vn)
M, and S ∈M ′ are such that
(3.6) M′ |=
1. D[θ, y],
2. p[S] is the Φs[n]-satisfaction relation for V q, and
3. p 6|=[S] [θ]q.
Suppose first that n is in the standard part of ωM. Then n ∈ ω; θ, y ∈ Vn; and
D(θ, y); so θ ∈ Θ. Thus, M |= θ. Also, {x ∈ M | M′ |= p[x] ∈ [S]q} is the
Φsn-satisfaction relation for M. Thus, by virtue of (3.6.3), M
′ |= ¬ θ, contrary
to the fact that M |= θ.
Thus, n is in the nonstandard part of ωM. Note that Vω ⊆ V
M
n , and it is
straightforward to show by induction within Vω that S restricted to formulas in
Vω is the satisfaction relation for M, i.e., for any s-formula ψ andM-assignment
A for ψ,
M
′ |= p |=[S] [ψ][[A]]q↔M |= ψ[A]. (3.7)
By virtue of the construction of M′, S is definable over M from a parameter in
M . This allows us to apply the Go¨del-Tarski theorem on the undefinability of
truth, the proof of which we reprise for the present application.
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Let φ ∈ Vω and z ∈ M be such that φ is an s-formula with free variables
v0, v1, v2, and for all ψ,A ∈ M such that M |= p[ψ] is an s-formula and [A] is
an assignment of its free variablesq,
M
′ |= p |=[S] [ψ][[A]]q↔M |= φ[ψ,A, z].
It is easy to obtain from φ an s-formula φ′ such that for all ψ, a ∈M such that
M |= p[ψ] is an s-formula with free variables v0, v1q,
M
′ |= p |=[S] [ψ][[a], [z]]q↔M |= φ′[ψ, a, z]. (3.8)
Let ψ = ¬φ′(v0, v0, v1). Note that φ
′, ψ ∈ Vω , so by virtue of (3.8) and (3.7),
M |= ψ[ψ, z]↔M |= ¬φ′[ψ, ψ, z]
↔M′ |= p 6|=[S] [ψ][[ψ], [z]]q
↔¬M |= ψ[ψ, z]
↔M |= ¬ψ[ψ, z].
This contradiction establishes the claim. (3.5)
Recall that we have supposed that σ ∈ Θ′ ∩ Ls, and that M is an arbitrary
satisfactory countable model of Θ. We have constructed the satisfactory struc-
ture M′ with the same “sets” as M, and we have shown that M′ |= Θ′. Hence
M′ |= σ, so M |= σ. Thus, Θ⊢σ, i.e., σ ∈ Θ. (3.4)
Claims 3.3 and 3.4 together establish the theorem.
Finitary proof of Theorem 3.1. The finitary5 proof is identical to the preceding
argument through the proof of Claim 3.3 but differs beginning with the proof
of Claim 3.4. We restate the claim here.
Claim 3.9. Θ′ ∩ Ls ⊆ Θ.
Proof. Suppose σ ∈ Θ′ ∩ Ls, and suppose toward a contradiction that
Θ0σ, i.e., Θ ∪ {¬σ} is consistent. Using Theorem 2.11, let M = (M ;E) be a
satisfactory structure such that M |= Θ ∪ {¬ σ}, and let T be the satisfaction
relation for M.
Like all models of S, M has an initial segment that is isomorphic to (HF;∈).
Since it is possible that V = HF, we do not suppose that HF is itself an initial
segment of M; on the contrary, we arrange that V \ |M| is a proper class, and
thatM∩M1 = 0, whereM1 is the class of 〈φ, a〉 such that φ is an s-formula with
two free variables v0, v1; a ∈M ; and {x | |=
T φ[x, a]} is not the E-extension of
a member of M .
Let E1 = {〈x, 〈φ, a〉〉 | 〈φ, a〉 ∈ M1 ∧ |=
T φ[x, a]}. Let M ′ = M ∪M1 and
E′ = E ∪ E1, and let M
′ = (M,M ′;E′). M′ is the canonical expansion of M
to a model of C; however, whereas in ZF we could let M ′ consist of definable
subsets of M , we now let M ′ consist of definitions of subclasses of M . The
5Note that we construe ‘finitary’ broadly to include C. As pointed out in the remark
following the statement of the theorem, the theorem and proof could be given in S.
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reason, of course, is that M may be a proper class. As a consequence, distinct
elements of M ′ may have the same E′-extension. We nevertheless define
=M
′
= {〈x, y〉 ∈M ′ ×M ′ | ∀z ∈M (〈z, x〉 ∈ E′↔〈z, y〉 ∈ E′〉}.
The equivalence classes of =M
′
may be proper classes, so the reduction ofM′ to a
standard model of logic with identity (i.e., one for which the identity predicate is
interpreted as the identity relation) would be slightly more involved than usual.
It could be done, but there is no need, so we don’t bother.
Let Ψ be the class of c-formulas with class-quantifier depth at most 2 (count-
ing quantifier depth in terms of alternations of existential and universal quan-
tification). Note that we impose no restriction on set quantifiers. All axioms
of C may be formulated as sentences in Ψ. Using the fact that T is the full
satisfaction relation for M, we can easily show that the Ψ-satisfaction relation
exists for M′ (essentially by direct definition), and we let T ′ be this relation.
Note that T ′ ⊇ T . It is straightforward to show that for every θ that is an
axiom of C or an axiom of identity, |=T
′
θ.
We now state and prove the analog of Claim 3.5 for the present situation.
Note that θ′, as defined in (3.2), is in Ψ.
Claim 3.10. |=T
′
θ′.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that 6|=T
′
θ′. By the definition of
T ′, this implies that there exist S ∈ M ′; n ∈ ωM; and θ, y ∈ (Vn)
M such that
(3.6) holds, where we may substitute |=T
′
for M′ |=.
As before, we first suppose n is in the standard part of ωM. Let H be the
standard part of HFM, and let ι : H → HF be the (unique) isomorphism. For
notational convenience, let x¯ = ι(x) for x ∈ H , and extend this notation to
assignment functions, so that A¯(v¯) = A(v) for any assignment A and variable v
in the sense of M. Then n¯ ∈ ω; θ¯, y¯ ∈ Vn¯; and D(θ¯, y¯); so θ¯ ∈ Θ. Thus, M |= θ¯.
It is straightforward to show by induction on complexity that S agrees with
T (the full satisfaction relation for M), i.e., |=T
′
p|=[S] [φ][[A]]q iff |=T φ¯[A¯], i.e.,
M |= φ¯[A¯]. Thus, by virtue of (3.6.3), M 6|= θ¯, contrary to the fact that M |= θ¯.
n is therefore in the nonstandard part of ωM. As before, it is straightforward
to show by induction within Vω that S restricted to formulas ψ in the standard
part of M agrees with T , i.e.,
|=T
′
p |=[S] [ψ][[A]]q↔M |= ψ¯[A¯]. (3.11)
As before, since S (actually, {x ∈ M | 〈x, S〉 ∈ E′}) is definable over M,
there exist z ∈ M and φ′ ∈ H such that φ¯′ is an s-formula with free variables
v0, v1, v2—and for all ψ, a ∈ M such that M |= p[ψ] is an s-formula with free
variables v0, v1q,
|=T
′
p |=[S] [ψ][[a], [z]]q↔M |= φ¯′[ψ, a, z]. (3.12)
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Let ψ = ¬ φ′(v0, v0, v1) in the sense ofM. Then ψ ∈ H and ψ¯ = ¬ φ¯
′(v0, v1, v2),
so by virtue of (3.12) and (3.11),
M |= ψ¯[ψ, z]↔M |= ¬ φ¯′[ψ, ψ, z]
↔ |=T
′
p 6|=[S] [ψ][[ψ], [z]]q
↔¬M |= ψ¯[ψ, z]
↔M |= ¬ ψ¯[ψ, z].
This contradiction establishes the claim. (3.10)
Recall that we have supposed that σ ∈ Θ′ ∩ Ls, i.e., σ is an s-sentence and
Θ′ ⊢ σ; and we are attempting to show that Θ⊢σ, i.e., Θ∪{¬ σ} is inconsistent.
We have supposed toward a contradiction that M is a satisfactory structure
such that M |= Θ ∪ {¬ σ}. We have constructed M′ such that M′ has the
same “sets” as M, and |=T
′
Θ′ ∪ {¬σ}, with the Ψ-satisfaction relation T ′. To
complete the proof we must derive a contradiction from the fact that Θ′ ⊢σ.
Theorem 2.13 is not available, because we have not shown that M′ is weakly
satisfactory. It is sufficient, however, that M is satisfactory. We make use of the
methodology of the finitary proof of (2.2),6 which proceeds by showing how to
transform a C-proof π of an s-sentence ν into an S-proof π′ of ν by the systematic
elimination of class variables in favor of class constants, and the elimination
of the latter in favor of expressions involving s-formulas essentially serving as
definitions. In this process, for each class constant C we define an appropriate
s-formula φC with one free variable, and we replace each expression τ ∈C by
φC(τ). The premises of π are axioms of C, each of which is replaced in π
′ by
finitely many instances of axioms of S. ν is not affected by this transformation.
If we apply this procedure to a Θ′-proof of σ, we arrive at an s-proof with
premises that are instances of S-axioms and sentences θφ obtained from θ′ by
omitting the universal quantification of S and replacing each expression τ ∈S
in (3.2) (which we imagine to be written out in full) by φ(τ), where φ is an
s-formula with one free variable. By construction, for any s-formula φ with one
free variable, {x ∈ M | M |= φ[x]} is {x ∈ M ||=T
′
p[x] ∈ [S]q} for some
S ∈ M ′. Since |=T
′
is the Ψ-satisfaction relation for M′, where Ψ is the class
of c-formulas with class-quantifier depth at most 2, and |=T
′
θ′, it follows that
|=T
′
θφ. Hence M |= θφ. (We could also use the fact that |=T
′
C ∪ {θ′}, and
each θφ has a proof from C ∪ {θ′} all of whose formulas are in Ψ.)
Thus, we have an s-proof of σ from premises that are true in M, from which
it follows that M |= σ. This contradiction establishes Claim 3.9 and with it the
theorem.
4 Universal satisfaction and forcing
The basic construction in the theory of forcing is that of a generic extension
MP,G of a transitive model M of ZF by an M -generic filter G on a partial
6We are paraphrasing somewhat Shoenfield’s original finitary proof of this result in [7]. A
proof that is directly applicable to the present situation may be found in [10, Chap. 2].
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order P ∈ M , where MP,G is the structure that interprets each forcing term
x ∈ MP as xG. M is referred to as the ground model. The usefulness of
this construction derives from the existence of a forcing relation M,P with the
following properties:
1. For any sentence σ of the forcing language LM,P,
1. if for every p ∈ |P| there is an M -generic filter G on P with p ∈ G,
then for any p ∈ |P|, pM,P σ iff for every M -generic filter G on P, if
p ∈ G then MP,G |= σ; and
2. for any M -generic filter G on P, MP,G |= σ iff for some p ∈ G,
pM,P σ.
2. M,P is, in a suitable sense, definable over M , i.e., over the structure
(M ;∈).
Note that as far as M is concerned, M,P is V,P, where V is the class of all
sets, so proper classes as ground models are an inescapable feature of the theory
of forcing, with V as the paradigm. Given a partial order P, we let P be V,P.
When the ground model M is a proper class, the assumption thatM models
ZF cannot be formulated as pM |= ZFq, as the full satisfaction relation for M
may not exist. In the context of ZF, we may implement this assumption by
positing pθMq for every axiom θ of ZF (M being given by means of a defining
formula). In the context of GB we have the option of formulating this assumption
as pM |=∗ ZFq. This use of |=∗ in the context of forcing raises an issue that
does not arise in other applications of |=∗ in set theory, which we will describe
presently, and which we will settle by means of a conservative extension result,
Theorem 4.9, somewhat akin to Theorem 3.1.
The issue in question arises in connection with the method of “arguing in
the generic extension” MP,G to prove that a sentence of the forcing language is
forced by a condition p. Actually, one does not argue in MP,G itself, but rather
in a theory appropriate to it, without assuming that G actually exists, and
uses the existence of the argument to infer the forcing relationship. Thus, this
method is applicable in particular to P, i.e., to V,P, even though V -generic
filters demonstrably do not exist.
Rather than working in the forcing language LM,P per se, we will work in a
more conventional language, with a signature s∗ that extends the signature s of
set theory by the addition of a unary predicate symbol V and constant symbols
P and G.
(4.1) Let Θ be the s∗-theory consisting of
1. ZF with the additional predicate symbol V;
2. pV is transitive and contains every ordinalq, i.e., p∀x, y
(
V(x)∧ y ∈
x→V(y)
)
and ∀Ordα V(α)q;
3. ZFV, i.e., all axioms of ZF relativized to V;
4. pV(P) and P is a partial orderq;
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5. pG is a V-generic filter on Pq;
6. pevery set is xG for some x ∈ VPq.
The following proposition is a key element of the theory of generic extensions.
Proposition 4.2. [ZF] For any finite subset T of Θ there is a finite subset F of
ZF such that for any transitive (set) model M of F , partial order P ∈ M , and
M -generic filter G on P, M [G] |= T with V,P,G interpreted respectively as M ,
P, and G.
At this point, some remarks concerning the definability of the forcing relation
are in order. Since M,P subsumes the satisfaction relation for a transitive class
M , the full forcing relation—like the full satisfaction relation for M—is not
definable over M , and P is not definable in the context of ZF. Instead, we
define, for each formula φ, the relation
{〈p, x0, . . . , xn−1〉 | p ∈ |P| ∧x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P ∧ pP p(φ)(x0, . . . , xn−1)q}.
(4.3)
This is, of course, a definition schema, not a single definition.7 In GB we have
the option of defining a universal forcing predicate analogous to the universal
satisfaction predicate |=∗, but this is irrelevant to the present discussion, so we
defer this definition for now.
The following proposition establishes the method of “arguing in a generic
extension”. The theorem is well known, so we only briefly sketch the proof.
Proposition 4.4. [S] Suppose ψ and φ are s-formulas with n + 2 and n free
variables, respectively. Suppose Θ⊢
(4.5) pfor all p ∈ |P| and x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P, if (ψV)(P, p, x0, . . . , xn−1) then
p ∈ G→ (φ)(xG0 , . . . , x
G
n−1)q.
Then ZF⊢
(4.6) pif P is a partial order, p ∈ |P|, x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P, and (ψ)(P, p, x0, . . . ,
xn−1), then p
P p(φ)(x0, . . . , xn−1)qq.
Proof. Let ψ and φ be given, and let Θ0 be a finite subset of Θ such that Θ0
proves (4.5). Let F be a finite subset of ZF such that for any transitive model
M of F , and any partial order P ∈M ,
1. M correctly defines M,P φ; and
7Alternatively, we may extend ZF by the addition of a new predicate symbol pq, with
axioms that correspond to the usual recursive definition of the forcing relation. Note that
these axioms allow us to generate a definition for the relation (4.3) for any given φ, but this
definition has quantifier depth that increases with that of φ, and the axioms do not yield a
definition of P in its entirety. Note also that, since pq is not introduced by definition, we
must explicitly extend the axiom schemas of ZF to formulas that incorporate the new symbol.
It is not hard to show that this theory is a conservative extension of ZF, so it is largely
immaterial which approach we use to the description of forcing over V , but in this article we
will deal with ZF unmodified.
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2. for any M -generic filter G on P, M [G] |= Θ0 with V,P,G interpreted
respectively as M , P, and G.
We now sketch a proof of (4.6) in ZF (without being too fussy about use vs.
mention). We begin by supposing toward a contradiction that it is not the
case. We use a reflection argument, followed by the transitive collapse of a
countable elementary substructure, to obtain a countable transitive model M
of F , with a partial order P ∈ M , p ∈ |P|, and x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ M
P, such that
M |= ψ[P, p, x0, . . . , xn−1], and p1
M,P φ(x0, . . . , xn−1). We let G be an M -
generic filter on P such that p ∈ G and M [G] 6|= φ[xG0 , . . . , x
G
n−1]. Since M |= F ,
M [G] |= Θ0. It follows that M [G] |= φ[x
G
0 , . . . , x
G
n−1], a contradiction.
In effect, we justify the method of arguing in a hypothetical generic extension
of V by arguing in an actual generic extension of a countable transitive model
of a finite fragment of ZF.
Note that Θ implements the hypothesis that V is a model of ZF by positing
each axiom of ZF relativized to V. In a pure set theory we have no other
option, as ZF is not finitely axiomatizable, and proper classes do not exist. In
GB we may use the satisfaction predicate |=∗ defined in (2.10) to implement
the hypothesis that a proper class M is a model of ZF as the single sentence
pM |=∗ ZFq.
The use of |=∗ can play the same simplifying role in the exposition of the
theory of forcing as in other areas of set theory that deal with proper class
models, but in the case of forcing, the following question arises:
Let c∗ be the signature c with additional constants V, P, and G; we also
treat V as a unary predicate in the usual way.
(4.7) Let Θ′ be the c∗-theory which is Θ with the following changes:
1′. GB.
3′. pV |=∗ ZFq.
When “arguing in a generic extension”, we will naturally reason from Θ′ rather
than Θ. The question is whether Proposition 4.4 applies with Θ′ in place of Θ.
In the absence of an affirmative answer to this question, the usefulness of
|=∗ is much diminished, as one must maintain a parallel development of forcing
without |=∗ to use when deriving forcing relations by “arguing in a generic
extension”. Thus, the following theorem is a great convenience.
Theorem 4.8. [S] Suppose ψ and φ are s-formulas with n+ 2 and n free vari-
ables, respectively. Suppose Θ′ ⊢
pfor all p ∈ |P| and x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P, if (ψV)(P, p, x0, . . . , xn−1) then p ∈
G→ (φ)(xG0 , . . . , x
G
n−1)q.
Then ZF⊢
pif P is a partial order, p ∈ |P|, x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P, and (ψ)(P, p, x0, . . . , xn−1),
then pP p(φ)(x0, . . . , xn−1)qq.
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Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.4 and the following theorem
(4.9).
Theorem 4.9. [S] Θ′ is a conservative extension of Θ in the sense that for any
s∗-sentence σ, if Θ′ ⊢ σ then Θ⊢σ.
Proof. We will carry out the proof in C. Since the statement of the theorem is
an s-sentence and C is a conservative extension of S, the theorem follows from
S.
We begin as in the finitary proof of Theorem 3.1. Thus, suppose Θ′ ⊢σ and
suppose toward a contradiction that Θ0σ. Let M = (M ;∈M,M0,P, G) be a
satisfactory structure such that M |= Θ∪ {¬σ}, where M0 = V
M, P = PM and
G = GM. Let T be the (full) satisfaction relation for M. Thus, |=T Θ ∪ {¬ σ}.
Let sV be the expansion of the signature s by the addition of the unary predicate
symbol V (without the constant symbols P and G of s∗). Extend M to a c∗-
structure M′ as before, by adding “proper classes” definable over M.
(4.10) Clearly, each added class is defined by an sV-formula from a parameter
in M , which may incorporate P and/or G.8
Let Ψ be the class of c∗-formulas with class-quantifier depth at most 2, and let
T ′ be the Ψ-satisfaction relation for M′.
Claim 4.11. |=T
′
Θ′.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that |=T
′
θ for all θ ∈ Θ′ other than
pV |=∗ ZFq. To show that |=T
′
pV |=∗ ZFq, suppose toward a contradiction
that it does not. Note that pV |=∗ ZFq is pfor every θ ∈ ZF, for every {θ}-
satisfaction relation S for V, 〈θ, 0〉 ∈ Sq, so it has class-quantifier depth 1.
Hence |=T
′
pV 6|=∗ ZFq, so there exist θ ∈ M and S ∈ M ′ such that |=T
p[θ] ∈ ZFq and |=T
′
p[S] is the {[θ]}-satisfaction relation for V, and 6|=[S] [θ]q.
At this point the proof of Theorem 3.1 bifurcated according to whether θ is
in the standard or the nonstandard part of M. In the latter event we obtained
a contradiction from the fact that S would include the full satisfaction relation
forM, which cannot be definable overM. That depended on Definition 3.2 of θ′
in terms of Φsn-satisfaction relations: if n ∈M is nonstandard then Φ
s
n contains
every standard s-formula. For this method (with (V;∈) and θ instead of (M ;∈)
and θ′) to be applicable in the present case, we would have to reformulate the
universal satisfaction predicate so that S |=∗ φ[A] iff for every Φφ-satisfaction
relation S for S, 〈φ,A〉 ∈ S, where Φφ is defined so that if φ is nonstandard
then Φφ contains every standard formula. For example, we could let Φφ consist
of all formulas with complexity not greater than that of φ in some appropriate
sense, rather than letting Φφ consist of all subformulas of φ, as we have done.
In the proof of Theorem 3.1 it was legitimate to define Φφ however we wished,
as the theorem does not mention satisfaction. In the present case, such an
8For notational simplicity, any formula requiring n > 1 parameters is replaced by a formula
with a single parameter, which is an n-sequence.
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alteration would be inelegant, to say the least—and it is unnecessary, since we
may proceed as follows.
As before, let H be the standard part of HFM. Note that H is also the
standard part of HFM0 , where M0 is the substructure of M corresponding to
M0. Let x 7→ x¯ be the isomorphism of H with HF. To simplify the notation,
suppose that (Ls
∗
)M is Ls
∗
, so ǫ¯ = ǫ for any s∗-expression ǫ.
It is easy to show (as in Theorem 2.21) that if θ ∈ H then |=T
′
p|=[S] [θ]q
iff |=T θV, so |=T
′
p|=[S] [θ]q, since |=T ZFV by hypothesis. Thus, θ is in the
nonstandard part of ZFM, which means that it is an instance of one of the axiom
schemas for a nonstandard formula.
We will suppose that the schemas are Collection and Comprehension. (Foun-
dation may be formulated in ZF as the statement that all nonempty sets have
an ∈-minimal element; it need not be formulated as a schema.) A sufficiently
general version of Collection is
p∀y ∀x∃Ordα ∀z ∈ x (∃Ordβ (ψ)(z, β, y)→∃β < α (ψ)(z, β, y)),
where ψ is an s-formula with three free variables. Suppose θ is the above instance
of Collection. We will derive a contradiction by showing that |=T
′
p|=[S] [θ]q.
Since |=T
′
p[S] is the {[θ]}-satisfaction relation for Vq and |=T p[ψ] is a
subformula of [θ]q, it suffices to show that
|=T
′
p∀y, x ∈ V ∃Ordα ∀z ∈ x
(
∃Ordβ |=
[S] [ψ][z, β, y]
→∃Ordβ < α |=
[S] [ψ][z, β, y]
)
q.
This is an instance of the Collection schema of GB and follows from the fact that
|=T
′
Collection.
The case that θ is an instance of Comprehension is not so simple. Suppose
θ = p∀y ∀x∃x′ ∀z (z ∈ x′↔ z ∈ x∧ (ψ)(z, y))q,
where ψ is an s-formula with two free variables. Given y, x ∈M0, we must show
that there exists x′ ∈M0 such that for all z ∈M0, z ∈
M x′ iff z ∈M x and |=T
′
p|=[S] [ψ][[z, y]]q.
By construction, S represents a subclass of M definable over M by an sV-
formula φ from a parameter in M , which is aG for some a ∈M0, i.e.,
|=T
′
p |=[S] [ψ][[A]]q↔〈ψ,A〉 ∈M
′
S↔ |=T φ[ψ,A, aG].
Thus, given y, x ∈M0,
(4.12) we must show that there exists x′ ∈ M0 such that for all z ∈ M0,
z ∈M x′ iff z ∈M x and |=T φ[ψ,A, aG], where A is the assignment of z and
y to the free variables of ψ.
Let u, v be new variables, and let φ′ be the sV-formula with free variables
u, v, obtained from pS is the {(u)}-satisfaction relation for Vq by replacing each
subformula of the form p〈ψ,A〉 ∈ Sq by φ(ψ,A, v). Without belaboring the
issue, suffice it to say that φ′ is a conjunction of formulas such as
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1. p(u) is an s∗-formulaq;
2. pfor any subformulas ψ and ψ′ of (u) and V-assignment A for ψ, if ψ =
¬ψ′, then (φ)(ψ,A, v) iff ¬ (φ)(ψ′, A, v)q (with similar formulas for the
other propositional connectives); and
3. pfor any subformulas ψ and ψ′ of (u), variable w, and V-assignment A for
ψ, if ψ = ∃wψ′, then (φ)(ψ,A, v) iff for some x such that V(x), (φ)(ψ′, A∪
{(w, x)}, v)q (with a similar formula for the universal quantifier).
We now have
|=T φ′[θ, aG].
Since T is the full satisfaction relation for M and |=T Θ, any deduction from Θ
holds in T . We will therefore argue in Θ as follows.
pSuppose (φ′(θ, aG)). Let p ∈ G be such that
pp(φ′(θˇ, a))q.
Claim 4.13. For every subformula ψ of θ and every V-assignment A for ψ, p
decides p(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, i.e., either
1. pp(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, or
2. pp(¬ φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q.
Proof. Suppose not. Let ψ be a counterexample of minimal complexity.
By way of illustration, suppose ψ = ∃wψ′, and suppose A is a V-assignment
for ψ. For any x ∈ V, let Ax = A ∪ {(w, x)}, the extension of A that assigns
x to w. By hypothesis, for any x ∈ V, p decides p(φ(ψˇ′, Aˇx, a))q. Recall that
p forces p(φ′(θˇ, a))q, which says that p(φ)q defines the {θ}-satisfaction relation
for V from the parameter aG.
Suppose p1 p(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q. Then for all x ∈ V, p1 p(φ(ψˇ′, Aˇx, a))q. Thus,
for all x ∈ V, since p decides p(φ(ψˇ′, Aˇx, a))q, pp(¬φ(ψˇ′, Aˇx, a))q. Hence,
pp(¬φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q.
The other recursive clauses in the definition of satisfaction are handled sim-
ilarly, and the atomic formulas are easily dealt with. (4.13)
Let x′ be the set of z ∈ x such that pp(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, where A is the
assignment of z and y to the free variables of ψ. Then x′ ∈ V by virtue of
ComprehensionV. Given z ∈ V, let A be the assignment of z and y to the
free variables of ψ. If z ∈ x′ then pp(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, so (φ)(ψ,A, aG), since
p ∈ G. On the other hand, if z /∈ x′ then p1 p(φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, so by the claim,
pp(¬φ(ψˇ, Aˇ, a))q, whence ¬ (φ)(ψ,A, aG), since p ∈ G.q
As noted above, the existence of this argument in Θ shows that there ex-
ists x′ ∈ M0 as required by (4.12), and this completes the proof that |=
T ′
θ. (4.11)
We now know that |=T
′
Θ′ and |=T
′
¬ σ, where T ′ is the Ψ-satisfaction
relation for M′, Ψ being the class of c∗-formulas with class-quantifier depth at
most 2. We now wish to derive a contradiction from the assumption that Θ′ ⊢ σ.
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As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, if we had Infinity we could arrange that M′ be a
set and take T ′ to be the full satisfaction relation for M′, from which the desired
contradiction would follow at once. It would not be inappropriate to finish this
way, as the theorem is only of interest in the context of forcing, which is only
of interest in the context of Infinity; however, an argument can be made that if
a finitary theorem has a finitary proof, one should be given, and we oblige.
To complete the proof in C we proceed as in finitary proof of Theorem 3.1,
showing that any proof π of σ from Θ′ may be replaced by a proof π′ of σ from
Θ. Let θ′ = pV |=∗ ZFq, i.e.,
(4.14) pfor all S, for all x ∈ ZF, if S is an {x}-satisfaction relation for V,
then 〈x, 0〉 ∈ Sq.
As before, we eliminate class variables in favor of class constants, and then
replace each expression τ ∈C by φC(τ), where φ is an appropriate “definition”
of C. Each axiom of GB used as a premise in π is replaced in π′ by finitely many
instances of axioms of ZF.
The premise θ′ is replaced by finitely many sentences θφ obtained from θ′ by
omitting the universal quantification of S and replacing each expression τ ∈S
in (4.14) by φ(τ), where φ is a formula with one free variable v. As before, since
each such φ defines an element of M ′ and |=T
′
θ′, it follows that |=T
′
θφ. Hence
M |= θφ.
Thus, we have an s∗-proof of σ from premises that are true in M, so M |= σ,
contradicting our assumption that M |= ¬ σ.
5 The universal forcing relation
We conclude by giving the promised definition of the universal forcing relation
and valuation function. We leave it to the reader to supply the definitions
of ‘ΦM,P-forcing relation’ and ‘ΦM,A-valuation function’, where Φ is a class
of sV-formulas. (These will cover all sentences obtained from subformulas of
members of Φ by substitution of elements of MP or MA, respectively, for their
free variables.)
Definition 5.1. [GB] Suppose M is a transitive model of ZF, P is a partial
order in M , and A is an M -complete boolean algebra in M .
1. Suppose φ is an LM,P-sentence and p ∈ |P|. Then p∗M,P φ
def
⇐⇒ for every
{φ}M,P-forcing relation F , pF φ.
2. Suppose φ is an LM,A-sentence. If there exists a {φ}M,A-valuation function
F then [[φ]]∗M,A
def
= F φ; otherwise, [[φ]]∗M,A
def
= 1.9
9
1 is the correct value for [[φ]]∗M,A if no {φ}M,A-valuation function exists, because in this
case no {φ}M,P-forcing relation exists, so {p | p∗M,P φ} = |P|, which corresponds to boolean
value 1.
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These definitions reduce to the usual ones when M is a set, and when M is
a proper class they permit the development of the theory of forcing in the usual
way.
As we have noted above, this universal forcing predicate is not involved in
any of the considerations of the preceding section. If we wished, of course, we
could reformulate the conclusion of Theorem 4.8 to be that GB⊢
pif P is a partial order, p ∈ |P|, x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ V
P, and (ψ)(P, p, x0, . . . , xn−1),
then p∗P p(φ)(x0, . . . , xn−1)qq,
which would serve the same practical purpose, and would be appropriate in an
exposition of the theory of forcing in GB using ∗.
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